This article focuses on the moral realist position defended by Thomas Nagel [needs linkTBD].
Nagel believes that moral truths exist independently of individual beliefs, emotions, or cultural practices, and can be known through rational reflection. He rejects the idea that moral judgments are merely subjective expressions of personal preferences or societal conventions. Instead, they reflect objective truths that can be right or wrong regardless of individual perspectives. For example, the claim “torturing innocent people is wrong” is not just a matter of personal opinion but a statement about a moral fact that is true universally.
Nagel contends that moral judgments can be grounded in reason. He believes that moral reasoning involves stepping outside of one’s personal perspective to consider the interests and rights of others, leading to impartial and objective moral conclusions. While acknowledging the existence of moral disagreements, Nagel argues that rather than undermining moral realism, they often arise from differences in the availability of information, reasoning processes, or the application of moral principles. That people disagree does not mean there is no objective truth to be found; rather, it suggests that not everyone has correctly identified that truth.
He is critical of moral subjectivism (the idea that moral judgments are based on personal feelings or opinions) and moral relativism (the idea that moral truths are relative to cultural or societal norms). He argues that these views fail to account for the binding nature of moral obligations and the possibility of moral progress. If morality were purely subjective or relative, it would be difficult to explain why certain moral reforms (e.g., the abolition of slavery) are genuinely improvements rather than mere changes in preference. Ecocivilisation offers us an objective destination point and suggests a framework for judging what is a genuine improvement. Ecocivilisation as an end point is not a preference, although which path we take to get there is, and so is the version of ecocivilisation we ultimately create.
Nagel connects moral realism with the idea that moral considerations can provide reasons for action. If moral judgments were merely subjective, they would not have the authority to motivate or obligate us in the way that they do. For Nagel, the fact that we often feel compelled to act in accordance with moral principles, even when it conflicts with our self-interest, supports the idea that these principles are grounded in objective reality.
He also links moral realism to the concept of human dignity, arguing that treating individuals with respect and recognising their inherent worth requires acknowledging objective moral truths. Without moral realism, the basis for claims about human rights and dignity would be undermined, as they would be reduced to mere social constructs rather than universal principles. Nagel defends moral realism because he believes it provides a robust framework for understanding the nature of moral obligations, the objectivity of moral truths, and the rational basis for ethical decision-making. He sees moral realism as essential for upholding the seriousness and universality of moral judgments.
The reader will make their own judgments. I personally find it very difficult to imagine how we could navigate collapse and build an ecocivilisation if we cannot agree that our morality should be founded on realism and rationalism, at least as far as that is possible.